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 Introduction 
How does trust form? A large and growing literature has sought to describe and explain trust 
formation and development (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001).  
Yet, to fully understand how trust forms we also need to understand why people trust. 
Conventionally, the “how’s” and the “why’s” have been seen as intertwined; people trust because 
their experience or other sources of information suggest that they have good reason to trust 
someone. In this paper we seek to disentangle goals and trust, and argue that people’s goals in 
interacting with other people influence the experience of trust. The experience of trust is not 
merely a cause of interaction and risk taking but the behavior and the commitments people make 
to specific courses of action also influence peoples’ experience of trust. Goals we suggest 
influence peoples’ experience of trust in ways that are likely to facilitate the attainment of these 
goals.  
Thus, this paper adopts a pragmatic perspective on trust: Paraphrasing Fiske (1992) and replacing 
thinking with trusting we argue that “trusting is for doing”. People’s experience of trust 
constitutes not only a basis for decisions but serves important ends in its own right and enable 
people to interact with ease and confidence. The effects of goals on trust we suggest tend to be 
automatic, often unconscious and uncontrolled (Bargh & Williams, 2008).  Depictions of trust 
formation typically see trust as an intention or willingness to engage in risk taking in relationships 
based on (i) a general propensity to trust and (ii) beliefs about the trustworthiness of the trustee 
formed through experience (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995).  Subsequent contributions have 
included other bases including categorizations (e.g. in-group versus out-group), institutional 
safeguards and normalcy beliefs (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998).  
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Yet, a core set of assumptions remain unaltered; trust is assumed to reflect peoples’ experience 
and beliefs with respect to properties of the trustee (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Butler, 
1991). The specific set of properties that influences trust reflects the nature of the dependency 
between the trustor and the trustee and the trustor’s goals in a specific situation and determines 
“what trust is all about”.  
Here we seek to redress what we see as a limited depiction of trust and trust-formation by 
offering a different conceptualization of trust which links goals and goal striving with trust 
formation. We define trust as a “psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998: 395).  
People trust other people in the context of interacting (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003).  A trustor is 
usually not a disinterested observer but is actively engaged in interacting with and seeking to 
influence the trustee. How we see, categorize, understand, remember and feel about other people 
partially at least reflects our interactive goals in that situation (Hilton & Darley, 1991). People 
moreover not only select goals but strive to attain them (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). 
Selecting goals versus striving to attain goals once selected involves different motivational 
processes that influence trust in different ways (Gollwitzer, 1990).   
People also commit to actions, and social relationships for reasons other than trust. Such reasons 
can be affective or practical, brought on by choice or imposed on people from the outside. 
Whereas conventional models of trust formation tend to focus exclusively on trust as the sole 
reason for commitments, trust constitutes only one of several possible reasons for committing. 
Other reasons may include habits, norms, values, a need for self-expression or self-respect or 
pragmatic and utilitarian reasons.  Thus, rather than trust leading up to a decision, trust may in 
some cases begin with a decision or a commitment (Koller, 1988).  
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People’s experience of trust not only influences peoples’ selection of goals but also influences 
peoples’ ability to attain those goals once selected. Trust enhances peoples’ ability to effectively 
influence other people in that people tend to trust people who trust (Williams, 2007, Weber, 
Malhotra & Murnighan, 2005). Trusting likewise reduces the load on peoples’ information 
processing capacity, and enables people to more effectively focus on task-interaction enhancing 
task performance (Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004).  
The relevance of goals on cognition, perception, liking and information processing is well 
documented. Ferguson & Bargh (2004) for instance demonstrates how the goal relevance of 
objects influences immediate liking.  A large and growing literature on affect-regulation shows 
how people routinely regulate their own emotions in ways that facilitate goal attainment in social 
relationships (Gross & Thompson, 2008). In the following we concern ourselves with the effects 
that goals and more specifically, goal pursuit and the different phases of goal pursuit influences 
trust.  
On action phases and mindsets 
Existing models on trust formation builds on earlier models of risk taking that attempts to 
integrate both goal selection and goal striving within one conceptual model (Atkinson, 1957).  
The “Rubicon model” of action phases brings a temporal perspective to goal-oriented behavior 
that begins “with the awakening of a person’s wishes prior to goal setting and continues through 
the evaluative thoughts entertained after goals striving has ended” (Gollwitzer, 1990: 55). The 
model differentiates between goal-selection and goal striving while introducing four distinct 
phases (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987):  A pre-decisional action phase in which people 
deliberate and ponder the expected outcome of behavioral options, a pre-actional phase in which 
people have chosen one behavioral option and are determined to follow this through. People 
start to plan, addressing specific questions about how and when and where they are supposed to 
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start acting. In the action initiation and actional-phase people seek to implement their goal and 
effort in this phase is assumed to be related to the volitional strength of the goal intention.  
Finally in the post-actional phase people reappraise their performance.  
Associated with different phases are four different mindsets or cognitive modes geared towards 
addressing the particular challenges and goals associated with the different action phases 
(Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987): A deliberate mindset is associated with a pre-decisional phase, an 
implemental mindset with a post-decisional pre-action phase, an actional mindset with an actional 
phase and an evaluative mindset with a post-actional phase. Here we focus on the first two: In a pre-
decisional or deliberative stage the primary challenge lies in making a correct decision (as of 
whether to work with someone or not). People deliberate not only to determine which of their 
wishes are the most desirable but also whether they are feasible. People thus seek information 
about the positivity-negativity of the consequences of different goals as well as information about 
whether a given goal is attainable. This requires an impartial, unbiased and open-ended search for 
information (Gollwitzer, 1990). People need to be sensitive and open minded towards 
information in general, including peripheral information that may impact outcomes or feasibility.    
In an implemental mindset people plan how and where to act in order to promote action initiation. 
In order for people to effectively solve the task the individual concerns him/herself primarily 
with information related to the task at hand. Effectively solving the task requires that individuals 
forms an initiation intention or commit themselves to act. Closed-mindedness enhances 
performance at this stage (Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989).  Thus, emphasis in an 
implemental phase is on the effective implementation of a chosen course of action. A highly 
critical evaluative stance would interfere with performance once people seek to implement their 
chosen course of action. In this stage people have been found to shift to a more narrowly 
focused style of information processing in which people focus on the immediate task and 
challenges at expense of more distant concerns or threats. To sustain the effort, people engage in 
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slightly biased thinking and produce more positive affect when compared to an earlier more 
critical stance adopted in the pre-decisional mindset (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995).  
Goals, action phases, mindsets and trust 
Goal pursuit influences peoples’ experience of trust: First, different goals have different 
implications for how people meet and see other people. Goals emphasizing outcomes that can 
only be attained in cooperation with others is more likely to offset activities likely to strengthen 
the experience of trust. Pro-social goals emphasizing the value of social companionship and 
social interaction for its own is also likely to offset activities that help develop trust. On the other 
hand, goals emphasizing minimizing risk, self-protection or even self-enrichment on the expense 
of others is unlikely to offset behaviors that lead to the formation of trust (Rusbult & Van Lange, 
2003).  
In addition to the type of goals people pursue, the process of selecting and pursuing goals 
influence peoples’ experience and the nature of trust. Specific events, cues or commitments to 
decisions or actions here initiate processes that mark the transition between different action 
phases and different mindsets (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).  Having decided on a goal people need 
to transform the goal into an intention. In forming goal intentions people move to a preactional 
phase, and forming behavioral intentions. Completing or attaining a goal or failing moreover 
leads to a postactional phase that shares some of the characteristics of the pre-decisional phase 
(Gollwitzer, 1990).  
Different occasions thus mark transitions to different action phases that present people with 
different demands and dilemmas, activating different mind-sets. Thus, committing to goals and 
forming goal intentions is likely to activate an implemental mindset whereas cues, events or 
shocks that causes people to reappraise their priorities or choices is likely to activate a deliberative 
mindset. Mindsets influence peoples’ attention to and memory of peripheral or incongruent 
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information, how people process information, illusion of control, degree of optimism, attitude 
strength and general affect (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995; Gollwitzer, 1990).  
A deliberative mindset thus appears to be associated with a broader, less biased search for 
information, a more realistic appraisal of skills and probabilities, with more critical and even 
handed information processing, less positive affect and weaker attitudes whereas an implemental 
mindset is associated with a more focused or closed search for information (Gollwitzer, 1990), 
elevated illusion of control (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989), more positive affect (Taylor & 
Gollwitzer, 1995) and stronger attitudes (Henderson, De Liver & Gollwitzer, 2008).  
The effects of mindsets on information processing are also likely to influence peoples’ experience 
of trust. As the experience of trust reflects how people process information and evaluate 
probabilities as well as peoples’ general affective stance, we suggest that mindsets will also shape 
individuals experience of trust (Gollwitzer,1990; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005).  
Positive affect even where unrelated or incidental to social interaction has been found to increase 
initial trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Lount, 2010). The illusion of control has been linked to 
initial trust (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998; Kramer, 1994, Langer, 1975). An increase 
in attitude strength may be linked to stronger trust (yet could also fortify distrust). Mindsets are 
also associated with styles of information processing and information search that are likely to 
influence peoples’ experience of trust. A broader, less biased search for information characteristic 
of a deliberative mindset is more likely to reveal uncertainty and risks than the more closed, 
focused search associated with an implemental mindset (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989).   
Mindsets influence how people process information, peoples’ appraisal of risks and their own 
control over outcomes and as a result shape peoples experience of trust. The type of trust 
associated with different mindsets is likely to closely reflect these different mindsets. Deliberative 
trust is likely to reflect the characteristics associated with a deliberative mindset and is likely to be 
7 
 
more tentative, more calculative, and more open to incongruent or disconfirming evidence and 
information. Deliberative trust is likely to be associated with less positive emotions, more critical 
processing of information and to be more easily revoked than implemental trust. Deliberative 
trust thus strongly resemble other descriptions of trust in the literature including fragile trust 
(Ring, 1996), calculative trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) or cognitive trust (McAllister, 1995). 
Deliberative trust is still a form of trust but an apprehensive trust in which a trustor decides to 
wait and see and is prepared to easily revoke the trust if called for.  
Implemental trust on the other hand reflects the characteristics of an implemental mindset. 
Implemental trust is likely to be associated with more positive emotions, less critical processing 
of information and a greater commitment to trust. Unlike deliberative trust, implemental trust is 
not easily revoked and if revoked, but is only likely to happen at a great cost to the trustor.  
Implemental trust accordingly has similarities to other forms of trust described in the literature, 
including resilient trust (Ring, 1996), affective trust (McAllister, 1995), identity based trust 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).  
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